Takaichi and Trumpt
Analysis

A Year of Confrontation: China-Japan Relations following Takaichi’s Remarks about Taiwan

Almost one year ago, when asked at the Japanese National Diet, what an attack on Taiwan would entail for Japan, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi asserted that any contingency involving the use of force or naval blockade could constitute “a survival-threatening situation” (存立危機事態, sonritsu kiki jitai).

Almost one year ago, when asked at the Japanese National Diet, what an attack on Taiwan would entail for Japan, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi asserted that any contingency involving the use of force or naval blockade could constitute “a survival-threatening situation” (存立危機事態, sonritsu kiki jitai). Despite diverging reactions to Takaichi’s statement, most experts on Japanese foreign policy would view “survival-threatening situation” as a legal term with relevant implications. According to a specific procedure enshrined in the “Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan”1, such a situation may trigger the use of necessary force to defend the country.

Beijing’s response was not long in coming. China’s consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian, posted a quite controversial statement on X, which he later deleted: “The dirty neck that sticks itself in must be chopped off”. While in China the post was read as a warning against any Japanese military intervention in the Taiwan Strait, which would be “chopped off”, Japanese public opinion perceived it as a death threat to Premier Takaichi.

Online debates aside, The People’s Daily, the Chinese Communist Party’s newspaper, defined Takaichi’s words a “deliberate provocation” undermining the spirit of China-Japan agreements, interfering with Chinese internal affairs, and violating the one-China principle. Beijing’s officials repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of Takaichi’s remarks about Taiwan, yet the Japanese prime minister stuck to her guns.

Within weeks of taking office, Takaichi sparked a diplomatic crisis with China, one that some commentators described as pushing bilateral relations to their most confrontational point since normalization in 1972. Tensions however have not eased in the following months, with China launching a series of punitive measures.

Beijing’s first movement came days after Takaichi’s declarations, when the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) discouraged its citizens from travelling to Japan. According to the Japanese National Tourism Organization (JNTO), Chinese visitors represent the largest group of tourists after South Koreans. As reported by the organization, Chinese arrivals from January to July 2026 totalled 1.9 million, a sharp decline from the 6.7 million in the same period of 2025.

Five days later, on 19 November, China reimposed its ban on Japanese seafood imports, officially on the grounds that Japan had not provided adequate technical documentation. However, the Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Mao Ning, added that, in the current climate, Japanese seafood would find no market in China even if it were allowed in, given public anger over Takaichi’s remarks. In addition, China also postponed a trilateral meeting between culture ministers from Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul which had been scheduled to take place in Macao.

On 21 November 2025, China’s ambassador to the UN, Fu Cong, wrote to the UN Secretary-General to set out Beijing’s position vis-à-vis Takaichi’s declarations. “These remarks are gravely erroneous and extremely dangerous. […] they seriously undermine the post-war international order” emphasized Fu in the letter. Three days later Japanese ambassador Yamazaki Kazuyuki, in turn, sent a response to António Guterres, highlighting that Japan has always contributed to the peace and prosperity of the international community, and that the prime minister’s remarks were in line with the right of self-defense recognized by the UN Charter. Two further letters followed: in one, China accused Japan of re-arming; in the other, Japan rejected China’s letter as “unsubstantiated” and “unacceptable”.

Since the beginning of 2026 the crisis between the two states has only intensified. In January, China’s Ministry of Commerce tightened controls on export of dual-use items to Japan, announcing a ban on exports for military use, as well as for any other end or purpose that would “enhance Japan’s military capabilities”. Dual-use items are goods that can be employed both for civilian and military purposes. They include “rare earths”, a group of 17 minerals vital to the production of energy, industrial and defense technology. The Japanese government described the measure as “absolutely unacceptable” and demanded its immediate withdrawal. According to a recent article in the Financial Times, Japan could run out of yttrium – one of the 17 rare metals – within “months,” and therefore has asked the US government and American companies to press China to ease its export controls.

Takaichi’s words at the UN General Assembly September session further complicated relations with China. In concluding her intervention, the prime minister has advanced the proposal to review the UN Charter, specifically the “enemy states” clauses. With the term “enemy state” the document designates “any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the Charter”. The clauses provide that the Charter does not invalidate or preclude action taken against such states as a result of the war (Article 107), that regional enforcement action against them does not require Security Council authorisation (Article 53), and that territories detached from them may be placed under trusteeship (Article 77). Beijing has criticized Takaichi’s request, claiming that those clauses have been fundamental in preventing the revival of fascism and militarism, and urged Japan “to take history as a mirror and earn the trust of Asian neighbours.”

It has almost been a year since the dispute began between the two countries, and the situation appears to be deteriorating. Japanese officials insist on remarking that Japan is a peace-loving nation, with an exclusively defence-oriented policy. Some analysts, however, point to growing rearmament, part of a longer-term project that Takaichi’s government has pushed particularly hard. This shift might also reflect a change in US posture under the Trump administration, which, according to some, is no longer a reliable guarantor of Japan’s security. Whether the shortage of critical minerals will push Tokyo to change course remains uncertain. So far, the Japanese government has responded by seeking support from Washington and diversifying its supply, not by revising its position, while Beijing continues to demand that Takaichi correct her remarks.

  1. The full name of the Act is: “Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Security of the Nation and the People in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations”
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